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Abstract 
In this paper, we draw on previous conceptual work and theories pertaining to 
historical waves of reform, in order to reflect upon and locate the recent and 
current changes in the UK Higher Education (HE) landscape.  Moreover, we 
consider the potentially catastrophic outcomes and consequences facing some 
HE institutions, and the sector as a whole, arising from the short-sighted and 
dogged pursuit of neoliberal policies – policies still being followed, we posit, at 
the precise moment when the current predominant neoliberal wave of reform 
nears its end.  Thus, we present the case that as neoliberalism is confronted with 
a terminal crisis of legitimacy ‘from within’ (a system crisis), so too are 
universities.  We therefore ask: What next for the HE sector and Universities?  
Will HE institutions ‘carry on regardless’ pursuing exploitative, ecocidal, 
meaningless fiscal growth policies that inexorably risk their legitimacy; their 
very existence?  Or will universities turn away from their generative role in this 
crisis and authentically begin to reclaim, imagine and practise another 
educational mission? 
 
Keywords: neoliberal education, refraction, waves of reform, higher education, 
economic crisis 
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Introduction 
 
Previously, the central tenets of the concept of refraction (Rudd & Goodson, 
2017; 2016) - a conceptual tool to support complex social scientific 
investigations and methodological and theoretical explorations of educational 
discourses, systems, policies and practices - have been set out.  Refraction 
promotes simultaneous examination of both structure and agency and their 
interrelationships (vertical refraction).  The concept focuses upon how and why 
dominant global (supra-) discourse and ideology is mediated through national 
(macro-) policies and how these are, in turn, reinterpreted at 
institutional/organisational (meso-) and individual (micro-) levels.  
Simultaneously, the need for analyses that situate phenomena and actions in 
relation to wider historical and contextual influences, and specifically their 
connections to dominant waves and cycles of change and reform (socio-
historical refraction) is also espoused (Goodson & Rudd 2017, 2016; O’Brien, 
2017, 2013).  In this paper, we focus specifically on the latter concern, positing 
that the HE sector and institutions have responded propitiously to neoliberal 
discourse and policies and, in so doing, have helped change the face and 
purpose of Higher Education.  Ironically, at a time when the neoliberal wave of 
reform is coming to an end, we posit that many HE institutions who have 
suffered the deleterious effects/affects of the prevailing neoliberal logic are 
likely to fall further ‘behind the curve’ and lose their legitimacy.  Indeed, we 
speculate that survival depends not only on new ideological and structural 
directions; it profoundly depends on the capacity of institutions to foresee the 
next wave of reform – a period of change which we refer to as the sixth 
supercyle  – in order to proactively shape future directions in HE reform.  
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In this paper, then, we briefly consider some of the current threats to the 
predominant neoliberal orthodoxy; contemplate the consequences for the future 
of UK HE; and speculate what this may mean should this sixth supercyle (and 
related HE reform) emerge.  We posit that this new wave of reform will not be 
driven by exploitative, ecocidal, meaningless fiscal growth policies which are 
nonetheless doomed to ideological and economic failure.  Instead, we speculate 
that the next wave of HE reform is now ‘in the making’ and that this 
development will be driven by new ethical, environmental and socio-economic 
concerns. 
  
Global financial and political fragility: The end of the neoliberal era? 
 
Whilst notable increases in various populist movements may be indicative of a 
burgeoning public dissatisfaction with political elites since the financial crisis, it 
may equally be argued that there has currently been little substantive change to 
the predominant neoliberal order.  Over the last decade, many countries, 
including the UK, have witnessed increases in unequal wealth distribution, the 
reduction of the state, and the growth in private ownership of former sovereign 
assets.  Paradoxically, the remedy for neoliberalism’s failings, as illustrated by 
the financial crisis of 2007, was the implementation of a more aggrandized 
version, such is its seemingly unexpurgated and obdurate appeal.  Of course, a 
large part of this appeal is its own presentation of ‘double truth(s)’ (Mirowski, 
2013) – thus, the corporate asset-stripping of previously state-protected public 
goods and services was successfully obfuscated as a ‘necessity’ and required 
continual duplicitously (manufactured) ‘crises’ to engender a fear of 
alternatives.  However, more systemic failure is likely to further expose and 
discredit the underlying logic of neoliberalism and may ‘tip the balance’ and 
bring down the whole ‘house of cards’.  The current reality is that this 
reconstituted version of neoliberalism has failed to fix the problems of its own 
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making and thus remains inherently fragile.  At the time of writing (September 
2019), this fragility appears more pronounced than at any point since the last 
economic collapse. 
 
In an interview to mark the 10th anniversary of the global financial crisis, Mark 
Carney, the Governor of the Bank of England, said major risks remain, 
including: financial changes that could arise depending on the Brexit outcome1; 
high levels of debt supporting the Chinese economy (as well as Europe, Canada 
and Mexico); the risk of cyber-attacks on financial systems; the high levels of 
household debt; and the slowing of the US economy (see Ahmed, 2018).  There 
are fears that recent US fiscal-stimulus policies, which have pushed the US 
annual growth rate above 2%, are ultimately unsustainable, with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2018a) recently reporting that it had scaled 
down its forecasts for both US and world growth throughout 2019 and beyond.  
David Lipton, Deputy Head of the IMF, also suggested that the next global 
financial crisis may be on the horizon, indicating that financial systems were 
unprepared for another serious downturn (See Partington, 2018a).  Other 
commentators point to different reasons for questioning the stability of global 
economies, which were reflected in recent ‘sell-offs’ in the UK, European and 
US stock markets. These include: rising US interest rates leading to higher 
borrowing costs for individuals and companies; political uncertainty (in Italy, 
for example); crises and uncertainty in emerging markets such as Turkey and 
Argentina (Kollewe, 2018), India and Brazil; and also unprecedented 
hyperinflation rates and unrest in Venezuela.  As well as uncertainty across 
global markets, the US trade ‘war’ with China is fueling market anxieties and 
fears.  The reality may be that the US economy is openly exposed to economic 
recession and that the true picture is being obscured by artificial stimuli initiated 
and continued by the Trump administration.  Whilst, the nature of global trade 
and stock markets means that economies are subject to uncertainty, boom and 
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bust, profit and loss, and bulls and bears, there are increasing signs of 
sustainable vulnerability.  This period of fluctuation, it seems, is premised upon 
inherent systemic uncertainties.  
 
In support of this proposition, we take note that in 2019 US yields on thirty-year 
treasury bonds fell below 2% for the first time (See Greifeld et al., 2019).  
Perhaps more alarmingly, in August 2019 the difference between two-year and 
ten-year bonds inverted for the first time since before the 2007 financial crisis.  
Normally, yields on ten-year treasury maturities (debts sold by federal 
Government) are expected to yield more than those of shorter time spans, yet 
the ten-year yields have now fallen below two-year notes, thus presenting an 
inverted yield curve.  When short-term yields exceed longer dated ones, it often 
signals higher short-term borrowing; meaning businesses face challenges in 
funding their operations and new investments stall, whilst consumer borrowing 
costs also rise and consumer spending declines.  This situation ultimately leads 
to a contraction in the economy.  Many commentators have suggested that this 
type of yield-curve inversion is therefore a harbinger of a recession, which they 
expect will occur over the next one to two years.  Such commentators include 
Professor Campbell Harvey who discovered the correlation between inverted 
yield curves and recession and who recently went on record to issue a ‘recession 
code red’ (See Townes, 2019).   
 
The Bank of England has also issued a stark warning over the rapid growth in 
lending to indebted companies around the world, with the US market for such 
leveraged loans alone (that is, loans to companies with debts already at four 
times their earnings) doubling since 2010, and growing at a comparable rate to 
the sub-prime mortgage market in 2006 (cited in Partington, 2018b).  This trend 
is not confined to US markets, “with a record £38bn of such loans issued in 
Britain last year [2017] by shadow banks alone. A further £30bn have been 
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issued this year [2018]2 …” (Binham, 2018).  Obvious comparisons with the 
2007 financial crash ought to signal alarm bells, yet the ‘business as usual’ logic 
is obdurately pronounced.  We must now seriously consider the UK’s specific 
vulnerability to future shocks and the futility of employing such logic in an era 
of unprecedented change.   
 
The specific economic frailty of the UK 
 
The UK’s seeming devotion to the neoliberal orthodoxy may inadvertently 
leave it increasingly prone to further shocks or instability, not only due to 
uncertainties surrounding Brexit but also precisely because of its dogged pursuit 
of the small state brand of neoliberal macro-economics.  For example, a recent 
International Monetary Fund report (IMF, 2018b) considered the level of public 
debt alongside the publicly owned assets of 31 countries and found that the UK 
had the weakest public finances, with an overall deficit of £2 trillion.  This 
equates to almost £1 trillion having been wiped from the wealth of the UK’s 
public sector.  Whilst it is often reported that the UK is in a strong economic 
position, this is often a reflection of the levels of growth, Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), government deficits, and so forth.  However, this ‘fiscal 
illusion’ does not account for the fact that the UK has sold off many of its 
‘sovereign assets’, such as utilities and other formerly nationally owned assets, 
leaving it increasingly vulnerable to economic shocks and global threats to the 
established financial order (see Chakraborty, 2018).  There have also been 
worrying indicators relating to the UK’s economic performance.  For example, 
The Office for National Statistics (ONS, 2018) highlight that the growth of the 
UK economy slowed to just 0.3% in the three months to November 2018 and in 
2019 it has continued to hover little over zero growth, narrowly avoiding a 
technical recession.  A recent report by PricewaterhouseCoopers (2018) also 
suggested that the fall in the value of the pound, combined with projections that 
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the UK is set to have the slowest growth across Europe in 2019 (European 
Commission, 2018), will result in the UK falling to seventh, behind India and 
France, in the International GDP rankings.  Recent uncertainty surrounding 
Brexit has served to further devalue the pound and destabilise markets. 
 
Overall, the UK economy appears to be stagnating and hovering just above a 
technical recession, with much of the private sector ‘flat lining’ or, in some 
cases, ‘contracting’.  With little growth in key sectors, as noted by Mark 
Carney, the Governor of the Bank of England, the economy is heavily reliant on 
household spending.  However, whilst data shows that there has been a rise in 
real earnings growth recently, a report by the Resolution Foundation indicated 
that household incomes had actually declined by 0.5% over the period from 
2016-17 to 2018-19 (Corlett et al., 2019).  Moreover, as a recent Trades Union 
Congress report (TUC, 2019) highlighted, unsecured debt (including consumer 
credit, student loans and pay-day lending – but excluding mortgages) has now 
reached an unprecedented level of £15,400 per household.  It is also worth 
noting that such debts have been accrued at a time of record low interest rates, 
meaning any subsequent increases will augment the financial burden on 
households, potentially damaging consumer spending and putting many into 
financial hardship, as well as undermining household spending levels on which 
the economy is so heavily reliant.  Recent austerity programmes, hitting those in 
the public sector especially, as well as the rise of short term, insecure work and 
the ‘gig economy’, have all contributed to a decade of lost wage increases, 
reduced disposable incomes and increasing household debt levels; meaning 
further economic contraction will have dire consequences.  Taken as a whole, 
the above highlights the precarious nature of the UK’s current economic 
outlook.  We must now consider, as part of this whole system, the special 
condition of UK Higher Education.  Specifically, we need to make clear 
connections between the UK HE sector and this wider context so that we can 
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better understand and evaluate the wisdom of recent policy developments and 
sectoral and institutional decision-making processes.  
 
Transaction(s), discourse(s) and instrumentalisation: The fragile condition 
of UK HE 
 
In considering waves of reform and their effects/affects, Goodson3 postulates 
that (neoliberal) waves of reform result in interrelated changes in the nature of 
transaction(s); dominant discourse(s); and, ultimately, the instrumentalisation 
of knowledge and academic practice in HE.  This three-way process can be 
clearly mapped against changes in HE following the financial crisis and 
particularly following the election of the then Conservative-led coalition in 
2010.  Since 2010, clear attempts have been made to further incorporate 
principles of marketisation and privatisation in HE, and a clear strategic 
reorganisation has been further ‘managed’ via so-called ‘austerity’ policies 
which are rationalised as economic ‘necessity’.  The chief transactional change 
in HE has been the significant rise in student fees – up to £9000 per year 
initially in 2012, rising to £9250 from 2017.  This policy has been particularly 
‘successful’ in re-casting students as ‘consumers’ and universities as service 
‘providers’.  Responsive (‘choice’) discourse(s) serve to recast the mission and 
purpose of Higher Education around market principles and perceived consumer 
needs within a neoliberal market economy.  A new range of related 
measurements and mechanisms, such as the Office for Students, the Teaching 
Excellence Framework (TEF), the National Students Survey (NSS), and so 
forth, all with direct or indirect financial inducements, were introduced to 
managerially frame such discursive practices.  Aimed at purportedly ‘driving 
up’ teaching ‘excellence’ and providing ‘value for money’ for consumers, such 
mechanisms serve to instrumentalise knowledge, teaching, learning and 
research, thus reducing their import to a set of responses to externally imposed, 
9 
 
unproven and unquestioningly flawed criteria and proxy measures (See Rudd, 
2017).  This has resulted not only in a repurposing of the mission of HE but also 
in increased bureaucracy and administration, de-professionalisation and the real 
loss of academic ‘assets’, as experienced ‘public servants’ are increasingly re-
positioned as human capital ‘units’ whose primary role it is to ‘service’ 
arbitrarily imposed criteria.  This new landscape is increasingly populated by 
corporate professors (Giroux, 2018), managerialists and technocrats, whose 
priority it is to ‘order and rank’, find funding efficiencies and instrumentalise 
knowledge and academic practice.  These professional groups 
effectively/affectively work together to impact and reframe long-held notions of 
‘scholarship’, ‘intellectualism’ and ‘the academy’.  Academic freedom is further 
eroded by research funding restrictions and by the redrawing of international, 
national and institutional research priorities towards an evaluation of ‘what 
works’; not ‘what might work’ or even ‘what should work’.  While there are 
always time and resource pressures within universities, new financial conditions 
are also leading to increased workload intensification, further wage contraction 
and ‘normalised’ levels of job insecurity.  Of course, in keeping with such 
neoliberal logic, financial conditions and remuneration are unevenly distributed.  
Whilst the majority of staff across the sector as a whole have faced a decade of 
below inflation pay rises, many in the most senior positions have seen their 
financial rewards increase disproportionately.  The Office for Students (OfS, 
2019) recently reported that 6 universities in England now pay their Vice 
Chancellors £500,000 or more in salaries, bonuses and benefits, whilst nearly 
half of all Vice Chancellors receive more than £300,000.  Furthermore, over 
60% of universities saw increases in the number of staff paid £100,000 or more 
in 2017-18; a rise of more than 15%.  This has occurred against a backdrop of 
internal restructuring, streamlining and ‘rationalisations’ across many HE 
institutions, with significant consequences for many staff.  At the time of 
writing (October 2019), another round of voluntary severance programmes 
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across the higher education sector has been undertaken, seemingly as a 
precursor to compulsory redundancies and further course streamlining.  This is 
once more presented as a ‘necessary’ cost-saving exercise in response to newly 
manufactured financial constraints.  At the same time, the need to further appeal 
to ‘consumers’ has led to unprecedented expenditure on new buildings.  A 
recent Higher Education Policy Institute report (Hillman et al., 2018) identified 
that universities spent over £3 billion in 2018, either on new teaching and 
learning spaces or, as likely, on new student residences.  The aim, it seems, is to 
increase income over the longer term, though this ‘investment’ is being rolled 
out at a time when staff pay, conditions and employment are being generally 
eroded.   
Crises are successfully constructed and the furthering of marketized values and 
principles is successfully advanced through the shaping of ‘ordinary’, 
‘everyday’ practices (de Certeau, 1984).  ‘Disciplinary technologies’, as 
Foucault (1991) terms them, are more than managerial or regulatory 
mechanisms aimed at structural reform; they strategically link ‘higher power’ 
and ‘lower power’ social groups and are key to reshaping individuals’ 
personal/professional identities and relations (see also Du Gay, 1996; Ball, 
2003).  While the emphasis placed on proxy and controlling measures often 
results in hyperenactment, fetishisation, counterproductivity (Illich, 1973) and 
forms of isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), institutions and their 
membership have to learn how to effectively/affectively respond to the new 
systemic conditions and constraints (Rudd, 2017; O’Brien, 2012).  The 
Teaching Excellence Framework (TEF) is a landmark initiative that is designed 
to further embed a neoliberal audit and monitoring culture into UK Higher 
Education.  The extent to which it is ‘refracted’ (Rudd & Goodson, 2016) will 
be, to a significant degree, influenced by institutional ownership of the four 
forms of capital - that is, economic, social, cultural and symbolic forms of 
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capital that may be exerted (Bourdieu, 1986; Rudd, 2017).  Thus, whilst the 
TEF is presented as an ‘equitable’, system-wide mechanism, the potential to 
effectively/affectively put it into practice and maintain a degree of institutional 
(and personal/professional) control of one’s values and tasks will vary 
significantly across the HE sector.  As universities learn to ‘play the game’ in 
line with newly imposed rules and regulations, they not only invest substantial 
time and resources, they also ‘re-form’ their practices in the hopeful pursuit of 
positive evaluation and financial rewards (O’Brien, 2012).  To illustrate, new 
financial conditions, allied with reduced state funding, have ‘necessarily’ led 
UK universities to seek new markets to ‘exploit’; with some no doubt faring 
better than others.  Many institutions ‘fear’, for example, that the reduction in 
the number of UK undergraduate applicants will threaten their financial 
sustainability.  And such fears – which ultimately stem from a system-wide 
desire for endless growth and profit – are not unfounded.  A recent Universities 
and Colleges Admissions Service (UCAS) report (cited in Adams, 2019b) 
showed that in the last year (at the time of writing) record numbers of students 
from China and Hong Kong (21,000 persons) applied for places at British 
Universities – to put this figure in context, the total number of applicants from 
Wales was 18,500 persons.  It is likely – owing significantly to varying levels of 
organizational capital – that some HE institutions will be less successful in 
‘exploiting’ such new ‘student markets’; while others who are ‘successful’ in 
their pursuit of more ‘gains’ are likely to further incorporate neoliberal values 
and practices.  Of course, differential ‘success’ can be explained away by the 
simple market logic of ‘winners and losers’ – in this sense, the ‘rules of the 
game’ go largely unchallenged.  However, it is likely, especially in times of 
further systemic failure, that such simple justifications will eventually be 
opposed.  
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Oppositional trends are emerging that counter the claims that these new 
conditions are delivering ‘excellence’, including greater student ‘voice’ and 
‘choice’.  For example, a recent report from centre-right think tank Reform 
suggests that universities risk losing their credibility due to ‘rocketing’ grade 
inflation.  It reveals that the proportion of ‘firsts’ awarded by universities almost 
doubled, rising by 26% since 2010.  Comparable findings were revealed by the 
Office for Students, the body now responsible for regulating the sector, who 
claimed that this was virtually a sector-wide issue, with 84% of universities 
seeing significant unexplained increases in the number of first-class degrees 
awarded.  Similarly, a report for the UK Standing Committee for Quality 
Assessment (2018) also identified that there had been a significant increase in 
both first-class and upper second-class degrees awarded.  Whilst the Committee 
state that it is difficult to pinpoint the causes, they also argue that any 
perceptions of grade inflation could erode the value of undergraduate degrees 
and undermine public confidence in academic standards and the sector. 
Moreover, the Universities and Colleges Admissions Service (UCAS, 2018) 
also recently reported that some universities are recruiting significantly 
increased numbers of students with unconditional offers, even dropping A-level 
grade requirements if students opt for their university as their first choice - this 
was said to represent over one-third of all 18-year-old applicants (ibid.).  It 
appears then that the (financially motivated) competitive clamour to attract 
students has contributed to grade/credential inflation, which ultimately may 
serve to devalue the ‘product’ which universities now ‘sell’.  The ‘product’ 
itself is becoming increasingly uncertain and uneven.  Drawing on Collins’ 
(1979) work, we can speculate that this situation is likely to lead to fundamental 
changes in the traditional university-student ‘contract’.  Presently, students pay 
high fees to gain a degree, which enables them to enter an increasingly 
competitive, though oft poorly remunerated and conditioned, workplace.  They 
may increasingly see this new credential ‘arms race’ (ibid.) as uneven; ruling 
13 
 
HE as producing opportunities for the ‘choice’ few, but not for ‘others’.  This 
division of ‘product’ and ‘social opportunity’ could lead to a new form of class 
conflict in education.  Perhaps this conflict – of the (neoliberal) system’s own 
making – is gradually being uncovered?  
Importantly, the lack of collective institutional resistance to such newly 
imposed conditions across the sector, and in many cases, the clamour to realign 
practices in response to them, now appears increasingly short-sighted, and 
possibly short lived for some.  Universities, especially those who have focused 
substantively on tuition fees as their main source of income, will now face 
additional challenges, as it appears the goalposts are being relocated and the 
‘rules of the game’ revised.  In February 2018, the then Prime Minister, Theresa 
May, launched the government’s review of post-18 education, led by former 
finance executive Philip Augar.  Its recommendations include limiting the 
numbers entering Higher Education by disqualifying young students from 
applying for a student loan if they fail to gain three ‘D’s’ at A-level.  
Highlighting the potential impact, the Higher Education Statistics Agency 
(HESA) data suggest that 16 ‘modern’ universities in England could lose 
between 15% and 36% of their full-time degree students, with many others 
seeing a substantial drop in numbers (cited in Fazackerley, 2019).  This alone 
would push many universities towards the financial precipice.  Yet, this will not 
be the only financial drawbridge raised by the government if these 
recommendations make their way into policy.  There is also a recommendation 
to cut tuition fees, down from the current £9,250 to £6,500 per year for some 
courses and institutions, as well as a proposition that some courses could be 
offered over two years rather than three.  Whilst there was little collective 
institutional resistance to the substantial realignment of HE, these newly 
proposed changes have seen Vice Chancellors openly resisting and lobbying the 
14 
 
government over the potential reduction in income.  For many, the shifting 
‘rules of the game’ are simply too much to take.   
 
All of this is occurring as Brexit negotiations rumble on and the uncertainty and 
the implications for HE institutions remain unclear.  However, the various 
scenarios attaching to the new ‘rules of the game’ could potentially have 
negative effects on both student recruitment and access to research funds.  
University leaders have already stated that a ‘no-deal’ Brexit would have a 
further negative effect on EU student enrolment, with Russell Group 
universities even claiming that there have already been significant decreases in 
EU student postgraduate enrolment in both 2017-18 and 2018-19 (See Weale, 
2019).  Yet, the foreboding news does not end there.  If recent, somewhat 
pessimistic, figures from the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR, 2017) turn 
out to be correct, demographic changes will result in a natural fall in UK 
undergraduate student numbers across the sector – down 5,000 persons from 
2017-18 and decreasing by 26,000 persons by 2021-22.  Despite accepting and 
generating the ‘rules of the game’ and focussing relentlessly on 
student/consumer numbers/income/data then, it is somewhat of a surprise that 
universities appear to have been caught unawares by these natural demographic 
changes.  Many universities, it seems, have failed to account fully for the drop 
in UK student numbers, leading the Office for Students to urge universities to 
be more realistic about their reported income and financial sustainability (Office 
for Students, 2019a).  The newest ‘rules’ - increased financialisation and 
marketisation, accompanied by new related measures of ‘success’ and ‘payment 
and awards by results’ - have come at a time when demographic and policy 
changes pose significant threats to student recruitment and, alongside this, the 
financial viability of many universities.  Some are potentially facing 
bankruptcy.  It is likely – if market and ‘business as usual’ logic prevails – that 
there will be takeovers by other UK universities and/or overseas universities 
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and/or newly formed private entities.  It is likely too, if such logic prevails, that 
there will be further work intensification for staff and further rounds of internal 
restructuring, streamlining and ‘rationalisations’ across many institutions.  Will 
those in regulatory power positions address inherent systemic crises or will they 
sustain the prevailing logic and hold individual institutions to account?  The 
newly formed Office for Students has publicly stated that it will not intervene to 
save any financially failing institutions:  
 
“Should a university or other higher education provider find themselves at risk of 
closure, our role will be to protect students’ interests, and we will not hesitate to 
intervene to do so. We will not step in to prop up a failing provider.” (Michael 
Barber, Head of the Office for Students, cited in Adams, 2018). 
Recent ‘re-forms’ will thus effect/affect universities disproportionally.  For 
example, whilst tuition fees for universities such as Cambridge reportedly 
represent only 15% of total income, for others, such as Falmouth, it represents 
83% (Hillman et al., 2018).  The ‘high stakes’ nature of ‘playing the 
(neoliberal) game’ is also highlighted in a recent Higher Education Statistics 
Agency (2019) report, which showed that almost 1 in 4 (32 in total) universities 
in England alone were in deficit in 2017-18, up by a quarter on the previous 
year (24) and up by over a third compared to 2015-16 (10). Whilst such figures 
do not give ‘the whole picture’, as there are a myriad of factors that contribute 
to a deficit in any single year, it does highlight the precarious position of a 
significant number of institutions across the sector.  Moreover, it also highlights 
the precarious position of institutions ‘playing the (neoliberal) game’.  Thus, as 
institutions continually realign themselves with neoliberal values, practices and 
rationales, such ‘game playing’ can seriously threaten their core mission and, 
for some, their future survival.  Further realignment can seriously compromise 
institutional (as well as personal/professional) independence and strategic 
direction.  To what extent, we ask, have universities become dependent on the 
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(neoliberal) direction of external policy ‘partners’ and to what extent have they 
themselves contributed to their own disempowerment?  Ultimately, the 
neoliberal ‘end game’ is to realign the raison d'être of universities to the fullest 
expression of economic ‘existence’.  If indeed we are to undergo further 
economic contraction, it is likely that we will also see responses based on a 
manufactured ‘reality’ and ‘necessity’ reflecting the existing redundant logic, 
amongst a number of other emerging discourses. Will universities simply 
respond to the newest forms of neoliberal realignment?  If they do, we posit, 
some will fall even further ‘behind the curve’, others will cease to exist, whilst a 
few may weather the storm and thrive. Nonetheless, adherence to an outmoded 
logic will likely undermine the legitimacy of the sector as a whole and raise 
serious questions regarding its purpose. Alternatively, we ask if universities can 
collectively lead out on the next development cycle of HE reform.   If they do, 
we posit, they may be able to authentically reclaim, imagine and practise 
another educational direction.  For some institutions, their very survival depends 
on this latter choice.  Indeed, given new external powerful forces at work, all 
universities may have no choice but to travel a similar path.    
The environmental imperative: Waves of reform and the future of HE? 
 
We argue that recent policy changes must not only be debated in relation to 
their potential outcome within the current reform frameworks but also in 
relation to wider change cycles and models. These are multifarious and none is 
definitive. However, they can help us avoid over-emphasis on contemporary 
solutions based on prevailing, predominant ‘logic’ and can support the 
development of a broader sociological imagination (Wright Mills, 1959). Thus, 
reflecting on wider change cycles can enable us to shed light on alternative 
possibilities and ‘think ourselves away’ from structurally and institutionally 
bounded ‘realities’. Whilst there is not space for fuller historical periodisation 
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and an examination of the various theoretical cycles of reform, in briefly 
considering just one of the major models (below), it is not difficult to see how 
this can refocus analyses and raise serious questions about the misguided nature 
of responses to recent policy developments across the HE sector.  
 
Kondratiev (1925; 1935) waves (or K-Waves), consisting of hypothetical ‘long 
waves’, or ‘grand supercycles’, are thought to last approximately 45-60 years 
and are denoted by rhythmic cycles incorporating alternating periods of both 
high and slow growth. The ‘up-wave’ of such cycles are periods of economic 
expansion lasting around 25-30 years at their peak, followed by downswings, 
often longer and deeper than the up-wave. There are varied and complex 
interpretations of K-Waves, with some commentators suggesting the last 
upswing (the 5th K-Wave) began in the mid 1980’s, ending in the mid-late part 
of the first decade in the millennium, with a downswing expected to last until 
the 2020’s. Others (see Salum, 2017) focus on the dominant technologies 
emerging in each cycle of capitalism, suggesting that the fifth K-Wave was 
characterised by telecommunications and informatics, and that the sixth wave, 
emerging around 2030, will be driven by developments in robotics, human 
enhancement technologies (HET) and alternative energies. Similarly, Šmihula 
(2009) drew on Kondratiev, suggesting a modified model, and predicting a 
sixth, post-informational technological revolution wave beginning in 2015. 
However, greater emphasis is placed on the specific technological revolution 
and Šmihula also suggests that each wave is likely to be shorter than its 
predecessor. The predicted, or hypothetical wave of post-informational 
technology, including renewable energy transition, purportedly began in 2015 
and is expected to last until approximately 2035. It could easily be argued that 
we may well be in an early innovation phase of such a wave. However, we also 
argue that whilst the existing ideology prevails, markets will not fully embrace 
and drive such innovations into the mainstream, not least because existing 
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patterns of conspicuous consumption, and especially the predominance and 
power of oil and gas based industries and markets indicative of the previous 
wave(s), are at odds with broader renewable energy transitions and lifestyles. 
To move to a full application and adoption phase of the next wave will also 
require broader ideological and systemic change and a move away from the 
predominant neoliberal orthodoxy. Whilst neoliberalism could engender and 
establish markets in areas such as alternative energies and renewable energy 
transition over time, its underlying philosophy and emphases on continual 
growth, unsustainable practices, financial profit, unequal distributions of wealth, 
and so forth, is clearly the antithesis of an ideology required to support full 
adoption. 
 
In recent years however, such wave models have been predominantly recast and 
used in an attempt to predict solely the performance of monetary and financial 
systems. It is therefore unsurprising that few, if any, commentators predicted the 
financial crisis in 2007 (or indeed, that there is limited detailed consideration of 
current warning signs, or of future ideology, social and systemic organisation). 
As King (2009) argues, the ideologically bounded responses of economists and 
policy makers resulted in the belief that the economic crash was inconceivable 
and that immediate responses were an attempt to restore the status quo. 
 
“… mainstream economists were the mental prisoners of formal models that made the 
global financial crisis unimaginable, and the heterodox economists who rejected these 
models were ignored, or dismissed as unscientific, by the mainstream”. (p.389). 
 
Furthermore, what is also often conveniently overlooked is that downswings are 
generally thought to be followed by a short period of relative stability and 
economic ‘recovery’ lasting around a decade, referred to as the secondary 
plateau.  During this period, the perception that things will continue as they 
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used to be persists. However, the anemic nature of the recovery, leaves 
economies vulnerable to fluctuations and uncertainty and, ultimately, it ends in 
a sudden, epoch defining, and potentially fatal, financial shock. We can 
postulate therefore, that the financial crisis of 2007/8 was, in fact, the end only 
of the downswing, and not, as many hoped, the absolute end of the economic 
cycle prior to another up-swing. Instead, since 2007 (what we have termed the 
reconstituted neoliberal period), we may have experienced a secondary plateau, 
with governmental and economic responses informed by the same ideology, 
perpetuating the misguided notion that things will continue as they used to be. 
The next economic crash may therefore be imminent but this time it will likely 
mark the end of an ideological wave, and governments, institutions and 
individuals will require a wholescale rethink of their purpose for being. As we 
near the end of this second plateau, there are few signs that the government, or 
HE institutions, have realistically considered this possibility. Therefore, they are 
not strategically positioning themselves to respond effectively to the next 
supercycle, which will result (at the very least) in their legitimacy and status as 
thought leading institutions being seriously questioned.  
 
We argue that mere reproduction of an outmoded economic and ideological 
model will no longer suffice, as we are now facing a far greater challenge than 
ever before. The blind faith in the promotion of conspicuous and invidious 
consumption (Veblen, 1899), predicated upon profit and loss motives through 
competitive markets, is unsustainable and impoverished. The exhaustive 
narcissistic, parsimonious and hedonic psychological conditions induced by 
hyper-consumerism, predicated on immediate gratification, have guided us to 
the brink of moral and financial bankruptcy but, more alarmingly, 
environmental degradation and disaster. This new ‘reality’ will influence the 
shape of the next supercycle and necessitate fundamental and radical changes in 
the way societies and economies operate. It will require a significant 
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refocussing of predominant systems and deployment of emerging technological 
developments. If Šmihula (op cit.) is correct, these wave-defining technologies 
are already in existence however, they are still in their relative infancy and 
currently bounded by neoliberal systems logic. It will require an ideological 
overhaul and systemic shift for them to become mainstream and fulfil their 
epoch defining potential. 
 
As Pelletier and Tyedmers (2011) state: 
 
“Market signals generated within our current economic system are inherently flawed 
due to the inability of the price-determining neoclassical paradigm to account for the 
central role of ecosystem goods and services and the limits of sustainable scale. As a 
result, the implicit and explicit use of price-based information introduces distorting 
biases that fundamentally misrepresent the environmental dimensions of economic 
activity from a biophysical perspective. We therefore propose that LCA [Life-Cycle 
Activity] models explicitly exclude market information whenever possible and rely 
instead on best-fit biophysical parameters…” (pp. 341-342) 
 
Across the UK HE system, institutions bought into, willingly or otherwise, the 
new conditions reflective of the reconstituted neoliberal period, rather than 
providing the academic thought leadership often associated with academia. In 
doing so, they have not only served to perpetuate and exacerbate a failing 
system and ideology but have also positioned themselves further away from the 
next significant supercycle and related waves of reform. This may ultimately 
undermine perceptions about their validity and legitimacy over the longer term.  
 
Of course, we accept that our arguments depicting the end of neoliberalism may 
be contested and considered naïve, not least because those with greater power 
and capital are always better placed to adapt and reinvent systems, and 
themselves, in order to respond to, and exploit, emerging local and global 
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conditions. They are too, better situated to reframe any crises of legitimacy by 
apportioning blame elsewhere, dismissing alternative narratives, and imposing 
sanctions upon, and thus ‘conditioning’, those already subject to their power. 
However, the current economic vulnerability is also occurring against a wider 
backdrop of uncertainty and dissatisfaction with the prevailing orthodoxy. This 
has spawned new sites for struggle and action and led to new social movements 
presenting alternative discourses, with a greater emphasis on social and 
economic injustices and inequalities and also the environmentally deleterious 
impacts of neoliberalism. Similarly, whilst the effects of recent HE policies will 
play out differently across various institutions over the short term, the system 
wide subordination to the neoliberal market epistemology is now being 
seriously questioned. At the time of writing, it appears that a series of national 
strikes focussing on pay, pensions and working conditions, are to be called. 
Student fees and their effects on levels of personal debt are now being discussed 
in relation to wider issues of wealth distribution and personal benefits, whilst 
the purpose and role of social structures, systems and institutions are now being 
scrutinised in relation to greater environmental concerns. 
 
Recent economic uncertainty has called into question whether neoliberalism can 
ever be a sustainable economic model, let alone one that can support social and 
ecological sustainability. Alternative discourses are emerging and intensifying 
and finding voice through less traditional channels, mechanism and populations. 
These are global movements with counter narratives that clearly single out 
neoliberalism and its lead role in promoting environmental degradation and 
climate change. As neoliberal economics once again teeters on the brink of 
recession, and perhaps collapse, we ask if we are at the start of a new wave or 
supercycle. If this is the case, how will societies and economic systems 
respond? Will they ‘carry on regardless’, culpable of pursuing exploitative, 
ecocidal, meaningless fiscal growth policies that inexorably risk their 
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legitimacy; their very existence?  Moreover, how might the HE sector respond? 
Will it embrace the ‘business as usual’ logic, or will universities turn away from 
their generative role in this crisis and authentically begin to reclaim, imagine 
and practise another educational mission? The real opportunities for the HE 
sector should be in leading the way and driving change, not clinging to 
redundant and unsustainable worldviews.  
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